Abstract-We study the effects of a change in financial aid policy introduced by an anonymous university in 1998. Prior to that time, the university's financial aid packages for low-income students consisted of grants, loans, and campus jobs. After the change, the entire loan portion of the package for low-income students was replaced with grants. We find the program increased the likelihood of matriculation by low-income students by approximately 3 percentage points, although the effect is not statistically significant. The effect among low-income minority students was between 8 and 10 percentage points and statistically significant at the 10% level.
I. Introduction
In recent decades, the average tuition at four-year colleges has risen substantially, from $9,539 in 1988 to $12,282 in 1998 (in 1999 constant dollars) (Digest of Education Statistics, 2000) . 1 This increase has engendered concerns that attending college is beyond the financial reach of many students. The public policy response has been to introduce or expand a variety of government grant and scholarship programs. 2 At the same time, several colleges and universities have improved their own financial aid programs in order to attract low-income students. This can be done in two non-mutually-exclusive ways. The first is to increase the amount of aid; the second is to alter the composition of the aid package, changing the mix of grants, loans, and jobs.
Although there is a substantial academic literature on the influence of tuition levels on enrollment decisions (see, for example, Manski & Wise, 1973; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991a,b; Kane, 1994; Rouse, 1994) , not much research has been done on the effects of different types of financial aid on student enrollment. The key result in the literature is that enrollment decisions are, in fact, sensitive to the price of attending college. Further, Kane (1994) finds that the decision to enroll in college is sensitive to both tuition and the level of Pell grants. The effects are roughly of equal magnitude and opposite sign, suggesting that net college cost (as opposed to "sticker price") is the relevant variable in the matriculation decision. 3 A smaller literature has attempted to estimate the effect of price on enrollment at a particular institution. Hoenack (1971) , Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) , and Moore, Studenmund, and Slobko (1991) each estimate the probability that a student accepts an offer at a particular school; they find that higher net college costs make students less likely to enroll at a particular institution. Additionally, Ehrenberg and Sherman find that the response is largest for minority students, middle-to upper-income students, and more scholastically able students (as measured by SAT scores).
A potential problem with such research is that the data lack a source of variation in college costs or financial aid composition that is exogenous to student characteristics. College financial aid offers often depend on the student's characteristics; students who are considered more desirable by the college administration may receive more generous offers. Hence, college costs and financial aid packages are likely correlated with student characteristics. As a result, in a regression of the attendance decision on net college cost, identifying the independent effect of college cost is difficult. In particular, the coefficient on college cost may partially reflect the effect of the student's unobserved characteristics. In an attempt to address the selection problem, van der Klaauw (2002) uses a regression discontinuity approach, and estimates that the financial aid offer has a significant effect on college enrollment. Dynarski (1999 Dynarski ( , 2000 uses the end of the Social Security Student Benefits program and the creation of the Hope Scholarship in Georgia as exogenous sources of variation and finds, in both cases, positive effects of grant aid on student enrollment in college. 4 In this paper, we analyze the effect of grant aid on student matriculation at a major northeastern university (hereinafter referred to as Anonymous University or ANON U). Like most selective colleges, ANON U administers its own financial aid program, and in this analysis we study a change in ANON U's financial aid policy. Prior to 1998, ANON U's financial aid package to low-income students included loans, scholar-ships, and jobs. 5 Beginning with the class of 2002 (which entered ANON U in September 1998), the loan component for these students was entirely eliminated and replaced with grants. Because this change in the financial aid policy induced systematic variation in the financial aid packages of low-income students that is likely uncorrelated with other student characteristics, this exogenous policy variation allows more meaningful estimation of the effect of the form of financial aid (and hence the price of attendance) on college enrollment. We implement a difference-in-differences approach to study the impact of this policy change on the probability that admitted low-income students enroll at ANON U. Our main finding is that converting loans to grants had no statistically discernible effect on the matriculation rate of lowincome admits. However, there was a marginally significant positive impact on the likelihood of enrollment among lowincome minority students.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the financial aid program at ANON U, both before and after the 1998 change. Section III provides a theoretical framework for understanding the program's effect on matriculation. Section IV describes the primary data for our analysis. Some descriptive statistics and the econometric results are presented in section V, along with a discussion of the interpretation and robustness of our results. Section VI concludes.
II. Institutional Background
In 1998 ANON U announced that the loan component of the financial aid package of every low-income student would be replaced by grants. University officials stated two major reasons for this change. The first was to reduce the importance of financial barriers in the decision to apply to or attend the school, and the second was to ensure that a recent drop in the number of low-income students matriculating did not become a trend. Officials emphasized that this policy was not undertaken to lure students away from other institutions, but rather to fulfill ANON U's commitment to provide adequate financial aid to all students.
When a student applies for aid, ANON U first computes his or her "demonstrated need," defined as the difference between the cost of college and ANON U's estimate of the student's ability to pay based on his or her family's financial position. The student receives this amount of support in the form of a package that potentially consists of three components: grants, loans, and jobs. Grant aid includes funds from any source (federal Pell grants, university endowment funds, and so on.) that are provided without expectation of repayment or any work done by the student. Loans must be repaid with interest, although the payments and accrual of interest may be deferred until some time after the student's graduation, and interest is charged at below-market rates. Job aid consists of a paid position at the university, usually made available through the financial aid or a related office. At ANON U, such jobs usually require 9 hours of work each week during the academic year.
These three forms of aid have different costs and values to both the college and the student. Jobs are relatively inexpensive for the university because the student performs services of value in return for the funds. Some student jobs are also subsidized by the federal work-study program, which pays part of a qualified student's wages. Loans are less expensive than grants for the loan provider, as they are repaid (even though the interest rate is usually low and the payments are often deferred for several years). To a student, grants are the most valuable, being essentially free money or a reduction in the price of college attendance. In contrast, the present discounted value of a dollar of loan aid is only about 50 cents. 6 Financial aid offers for students admitted to ANON U are calculated according to the following process. The financial aid staff begins by determining the student's family contribution (a function of the family's financial resources). If the family's calculated ability to pay is less than the cost of attending ANON U, then the student qualifies for financial aid. In composing the financial aid package, the financial aid staff starts by filling the gap with job aid up to a maximum amount and then with loans up to a standard amount (at least before the new program took effect), followed by grants to fill any remaining gap between the student's ability to pay and the cost of ANON U. The financial aid staff then adjusts the package where deemed appropriate. Because of this final adjustment, there is no straightforward algorithm that exactly determines each student's financial aid package.
The cost of attending ANON U rose from $27,729 in 1988 to $34,171 in 2000, and ANON U's financial aid packages grew along with it. (All dollar figures in this paper are expressed in 1999 dollars unless otherwise specified.) In 1988, the standard financial aid package included $2,028 in job aid, rising slightly to $2,109 in 2000. Over the same period, the base loan amount increased from $3,731 to $4,063, and the remaining grant component increased from a median of $11,865 to $14,842. 7 The new policy announced in January 1998 made ANON U more attractive to low-income students by giving them grants in place of the loans they would have received under the old regime. Under the new policy, the loan component of these students' packages was completely eliminated and replaced with grants. That is, a low-income student who would have been expected to borrow $4,000 per year was 5 Not all students who qualify for financial aid are considered lowincome. The detailed definition of low-income status is discussed below, in section II. 6 The precise value, of course, depends on factors such as the particular terms of the loan and the student's discount rate (McPherson and Schapiro, 1991b; Feldstein, 1995) . 7 The median is calculated among students receiving grant aid.
instead given an additional $4,000 in grants for 1998-1999. 8 The total amount of financial aid was not affected, only the composition. An important aspect of the process is how the financial aid office classifies students as low-income. Before 1998, the financial aid office defined low-income status based on expected parental contribution. 9 If the student's parental contribution was less than $2,000, he or she would likely be classified as low-income. Low-income students were often asked to take somewhat smaller loans than other students, although not according to a strict formula. Under the new policy, students are classified as low-income if their family income is less than the national median family income-$41,955 for the class entering in 1998. 10 ANON U officials estimated that this new program would cost approximately $1.7 million per year by the time it was fully phased in, in fiscal year 2002. The goal of this paper is to determine whether this expenditure has increased the yield (percentage of admitted students enrolling) among low-income students, and if so, by how much.
A key question is whether ANON U instituted other innovations that might affect yield rates at the same time that it replaced the loan component of financial aid packages with grants. In particular, were there any changes in outreach programs to high school students to encourage them to apply, or changes in strategies to convince accepted students to matriculate? We posed this question to the director of the admissions office and learned that no substantially different recruitment strategies were used for the graduating classes of 2002, 2003, and 2004 (the first three years of the new financial aid policy) than for prior classes. Some new approaches to recruiting low-income students were introduced for the class of 2005, but members of this and subsequent classes are not included in our analysis (see below). In short, we do not believe there were any concurrent changes in the activities undertaken by ANON U's admissions office that would confound our efforts to isolate the impact of the change in financial aid policy.
III. Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a simple two-period model of how ANON U's change in financial aid policy might affect matriculation decisions. Suppose that a student admitted to ANON U has the utility function UϭU(Y), where Y represents income after graduation. The student is risk-averse, with UЈ(Y)Ͼ0 and UЉ(Y) Ͻ 0. In the first period, the student decides whether or not to enroll at ANON U. In the second period, with probability p the student will receive a good job and earn income G, and with probability 1Ϫp she will get a bad job and earn B. 11 For simplicity, assume that if the student enrolls at ANON U, then she must take out loans that require a payment of L in the second period. Before the policy change, L is positive, and after the policy change, L is zero for low-income students. If the student attends a different college, her expected utility is A, which is unaffected by the policy change at ANON U (an assumption we assess below).
The student chooses to attend ANON U if the expected utility from attending ANON U is greater than the expected utility from attending her alternative college. The expected utility of attending ANON U is
The expected utility of the alternative, by assumption, is
where is the net benefit, in expected-utility terms, of choosing ANON U over the alternative. To find the impact when loans are reduced by the policy change at ANON U, we compute
Because UЈ(Y) Ͼ 0 for all Y, we have ‫‪L‬ץ/ץ‬ Ͻ 0. The policy change, which decreases L, increases , making ANON U more attractive than the alternative. An interesting question is whether some students would be more responsive to the loan-reduction program than others. The extent to which ANON U becomes more attractive depends on p:
which is positive, because UЉ Ͻ 0 (decreasing marginal utility of income) implies that UЈ(BϪL) Ͼ UЈ(GϪL). If a student has a lower p, then ‫‪L‬ץ/ץ‬ is more negative, she has a larger loss of utility from an increase in loans, and a given loan reduction has a larger effect on the relative attractiveness of ANON U over an alternative. Thus, the model predicts 8 ANON U made other changes to its financial aid policy for the class of 2002. For students whose family incomes were just above the low-income range, loans were reduced by smaller, graduated amounts. In addition, for low-and middle-income students, family assets were redefined to include only a portion of housing equity. Because we lack adequate information on housing assets, we cannot fully incorporate these changes into our analysis. However, we do allow for the effect of the middle-income change in tables 4 and 6.
9 The student's ability to pay is composed of two parts: the expected parental contribution and the contribution from the student's own resources (for example, from summer jobs and external scholarships).
10 This figure is the median among families with children under age 18 in 1996, the latest year for which data were available when the cutoff was set in late 1997 for students entering in the fall of 1998. We report nominal dollars because the Financial Aid Office based its low-income classification on nominal dollars.
that the program will have a greater effect on matriculation at ANON U for those students with lower a priori expectations of getting a good job. Equation (5) will prove useful in interpreting some of our results below.
IV. Data and Econometric Model

A. Data
Admissions Data: Our primary data come from the administrative archives of ANON U's Financial Aid Office. The database contains detailed financial aid and admissions information on each year's admitted students, including financial information such as family income and assets and the composition of their financial aid packages. We analyze data from the classes of 1992 through 2004 (who entered in 1988 through 2000) . The data are proprietary and sensitive, as they contain detailed individual financial information on ANON U's undergraduates and alumni. The archiving is done after the admissions process is complete but before the students actually begin classes.
We began with 25,958 individual students' records and dropped 1,433 observations with missing or ambiguous information. 12 Additionally, because the program is particularly targeted at American students and because international students' financial indicators are relatively difficult to interpret, for most of the analysis we focused on U.S. citizens, reducing the sample by an additional 2,465 records. Another 8,359 admitted students were excluded from the primary analysis because they applied for early decision or early action. 13 These students chose to commit to, or at least focus on, ANON U before they received financial aid offers. Their enrollment decisions, therefore, were likely less sensitive to financial aid, and it is not appropriate to include them with regular admission applicants. More importantly, early decision application binds the student to attend if accepted, so there is no choice to model conditional on admission.
SAT Test-Taker Data: As a secondary source of information, we also analyze data on SAT test-takers from the College Board. The idea is to assess whether ANON U's change in financial aid policy affected the applicant pool, because if the applicant pool changed in such a way as to affect yield rates, it would cloud the interpretation of our results. We have data on students projected by the College Board to have graduated from high school between 1994 and 2001. The sample includes all African-American and Hispanic SAT takers, all test takers from California and Texas, and a 25% sample of nonblack, non-Hispanic test takers residing outside of California and Texas. 14 These data contain limited information on personal characteristics, including crude measures of family income, 15 parental education, and participation in extracurricular activities, and academic achievement (as measured by the student's math and verbal SAT scores). Most importantly, the data contain information on up to 20 (for the years 1994-1998) and 30 (for the years following 1998) institutions to which the student requested the SAT scores be sent. 16 We characterize a student as having interest in applying to ANON U if she indicates that her SAT scores should be sent to ANON U. Though this indicator is an imperfect measure of who eventually applies to ANON U, we believe that it is highly correlated. We assume that test-takers who took the SAT after January 1998 (when the policy change was announced) were exposed to the change in financial aid policy and constitute the treatment group; students who took the test before January 1998 form the comparison group. 17 Using these data we created a sample analogous to the admissions data from ANON U. The sample includes only U.S. citizens who were attending a domestic school at the time of registration for the SAT and who were not missing information on their race or ethnicity. In addition, we dropped students who were missing test scores (these students registered for the test but did not actually take it), and those who did not specify any school to receive their scores. Our final analysis sample includes 3,031,573 individuals; table A1 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics on these data.
B. Econometric Model
We estimate the impact of the change in financial aid policy on admitted low-income students' likelihood of enrolling at ANON U by modeling the individual student's decision to accept ANON U's admissions offer as a conventional probit model: 12 In most of these cases, there was a problem in the coding of the student's enrollment decision.
13 ANON U switched from a nonbinding early-action policy to a binding early-decision policy beginning with the class of 2000.
14 This sample is rather unusual because it was compiled for another project. With the weights, however, it is nationally representative. 15 Family income is reported in ranges. We use midpoints of these ranges to code students as low-income, following the same definition as in the ANON U admissions data: family income below the national median. 16 We include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the student had the option to request 30 institutions (that is, whether or not the student took the SAT in 1999 or later). The inclusion of this dummy variable does not change the results, because most students list fewer than 20 institutions. 17 There are other possible criteria for identifying students potentially affected by the change in financial aid policy. One is whether the student was likely to have graduated from high school after the 1998 policy change (that is, graduated from high school in 1999 or after). Another is to use the date that the student submitted his or her questionnaire to the College Board. The results using these alternative measures are quite similar. In addition, we drop 66,160 students who took the SAT in 2001, for we have data only for the first few months of that year.
where E it is the probability that student i chooses to enroll at ANON U in year t, F[ ] is the cumulative normal distribution function, X it is a vector of student characteristics (described in the next section), P t is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student applied after the 1998 change in financial aid (that is, it equals 1 for all students in the classes of 2002, 2003, and 2004) , LI it is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student is classified as low-income, and ␤ 1 , ␤ 2 , ␤ 3 , ␥, and ␣ are parameters to be estimated. To allow comparisons between low-income students before and after the policy change, we reclassify students from all classes as lowincome according to the definition adopted by the financial aid office at the time of the policy change. That is, we classify students as low-income if their family income was below the national median for families with children under 18 in the year before they applied.
The coefficient ␤ 1 reflects the change in probability that non-low-income students in the classes of 2002, 2003, and 2004 (those that applied after the change in financial aid) enrolled at ANON U relative to those who applied earlier. Thus, it measures the impact of all aspects of the postprogram environment that might have affected the probability of accepting an offer of admission. The coefficient ␤ 2 measures the difference in probability of enrolling at ANON U between students who were classified as low-income and those who were not, for all classes. The coefficient ␤ 3 , on the interaction between P t and LI it , reflects the incremental effect on the probability of accepting admission at ANON U for low-income students after the change in financial aid took effect. It is, therefore, our coefficient of interest-the difference-in-differences estimator for this program. The identifying assumption is that the change in financial aid policy did not affect the enrollment rates of non-low-income students. Further, we assume that ANON U's peer institutions did not respond by also changing their financial aid policies. Such a response could confound the interpretation of our results, and we return to this issue below.
Equation (6) implicitly assumes that the effect of the new program was the same for each class. We also estimate an alternative specification that allows the effect of the program to vary by class:
where C t is a set of binary variables that take a value of 1 if a student is in a particular class, and 0 otherwise (the omitted class is 1999), C t ϫ LI it is a set of interactions between the class effects and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student was low-income, and the other notation is as defined above. Each of these interactions shows, for the respective class, the difference in the probability of acceptance between low-income students in that class and the other students, ceteris paribus. This specification contains no single regression coefficient that summarizes the effect of the program. We therefore estimate the effect of the program as the average of the coefficients of the interaction terms (␤ 3t ) during the program period (that is, for the classes of 2002, 2003, and 2004) , and compare it to the average for the classes in the years before the program. 18 The difference between the averages is the net program effect.
V. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 exhibits mean student characteristics over the entire sample period. These statistics refer to admitted U.S. citizens who applied by regular decision, not early action or early decision. We present statistics on income status, financial aid status, sex, census division of residence, ethnicity, whether the student was a recruited athlete, and the student's academic and nonacademic ratings as assigned by the admissions office. The academic rating was based on factors such as high school grades, SAT scores, prior experience with graduates of the same high school, and teacher recommendations. An academic rating of A was given to students who were best prepared academically (for example, with high grades and high SAT scores); an academic rating of E was given to the least-prepared students. The nonacademic rating was determined by a variety of attributes such as leadership, athletic or artistic ability, and volunteer work. The nonacademic ratings also ranged from A to E. We report means of the various student characteristics broken down by whether the student was low-income (again retroactively applying the postchange definition) and by whether the student enrolled.
Of the admitted low-income students in our analysis sample, 98% were awarded financial aid, 19 compared to only 43% of non-low-income students. Further, relative to high-income students, low-income students had on average lower admissions ratings (both academic and nonacademic), were less likely to be athletes or children of alumni, and were more likely to be in minorities. (Throughout our analysis, we classify students as minority if they identified themselves as African-American, Hispanic, or Native American. We do not classify Asian students as minority.) The fraction of minority students in our sample is quite high, approximately one-fourth of the overall sample and increasing to nearly one-third by the end of the analysis period, as shown in table 2. This is higher than the overall fraction of minority students at ANON U, as minority students were relatively more likely to apply regular decision, and hence to be included in our analysis sample. Table 2 contains time series data on key characteristics of ANON U students in our analysis sample. Since the early 1990s, the percentage of admitted students who were lowincome has ranged from approximately 8% to 12%; the percentage of enrolled students who were low-income has ranged from 7% to 14%. 20 The fraction of admitted and enrolled students receiving financial aid has ranged between 45% and 58%. Over time, the percentages of females and minorities have increased. Both the academic and nonacademic ratings of the classes have improved. 21 Further, smaller proportions of later classes have been recruited athletes.
Aggregate yield rate data from the classes of 1992 through 2004 are summarized in table 3. The first column indicates that yield rates at ANON U increased over time, starting at approximately 55% in the early 1990s and ending at 72% for the class of 2004. As noted in section IV, we focus on students who went through the regular admission process. Because early-decision students were committed to enroll, and early-action students were very likely to do so, the yield rates for students admitted under regular admission were lower than those for all admitted students. Although yields from the regular admission group also increased, the trend rate was slower (from 47% in the class of 1992 to 53% in the class of 2004).
The next two columns show the yield rates by income status, again imposing the 1998 definition of "low-income" on all classes. For convenience, these rates are graphed in the upper panel of figure 1. At the beginning of the period, the yield rate for low-income students was below that for students who were not, but by the end of the sample period, the situation was reversed. Enrollments of African-American, Hispanic, and Native American (minority) students have been a matter of special concern at ANON U and a number of other institutions, so in the last two columns (and the lower panel of figure 1 ) we show yield rates among minorities. Figure 1 indicates that the difference in yield rates between low-income and non-low-income students has widened since the change in the financial aid program, suggesting that the change in financial aid composition had an 20 These calculations use the national-median-based low-income definition for all classes, retroactively for those earlier than the class of 2002. 21 The nonacademic ratings for the class of 1992 are on a different scale than other classes. Notes: Only includes non-early-admission U.S. citizens. Minority students include those who self-report as African-American, Hispanic, or Native American. All dollar amounts are in 1999 dollars. The cost of attendance is the university's published total of tuition, fees, room and board, and additional expenses. Whether or not a student is categorized as low-income is defined retroactively according to the post-2002 definition (see text).
*A is the highest admissions rating; B is the second highest (see text). Nonacademic rating in 1992 is coded differently and is not comparable. †Among financial aid recipients. 
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impact on the matriculation of low-income students. However, the figure also highlights some difficulties with this conclusion. First, note that the overall yield rates for classes in the early 1990s were quite a bit lower than those for the last three classes, the "treatment" group. Hence, if we visually compare the last three classes with their predecessors as a group, it appears that the yield rates increased during the program period. On the other hand, suppose that we choose to make the comparison group only the four classes before the program was introduced. In this case, the answer from visual inspection is no longer quite so clear.
Similarly, we cannot know whether the unusually low yield among low-income students for the class of 2001 reflected a permanent change in the yield rates that would have continued had ANON U not changed its financial aid policy, or whether it was a transitory change. If the yield for the class of 2001 reflected a permanent change, then it makes sense to use it as a base from which to evaluate the financial aid program. In contrast, if the yield for the class of 2001 reflected a transitory change, then its inclusion in the analysis will artificially inflate the estimated impact of the program.
One possibility is that the patterns in figure 1 are driven by changes in student characteristics over time. To investigate this issue, in figure 2 we show the time series in yield rates adjusted for student characteristics. (The adjustments are based on a probit regression that controls for race, gender, total size of financial aid award, alumni child, region of permanent residence, recruited athlete, and both academic and nonacademic rankings for admission.) 22 Though the regression-adjusted variation in yield rates is somewhat smaller than the unadjusted variation, the patterns do not change enough to resolve the ambiguities just discussed. In short, the time series pattern of yield rates raises the possibility that our substantive results may be sensitive to the choice of comparison classes. Our statistical analysis explicitly takes this possibility into account.
Another concern is that the yield rates among different income groups may have moved differently over time for reasons that have nothing to do with ANON U's financial aid practices. Although we cannot know what would have happened at ANON U if it had not changed its policy, we can compare the time series on yield rates at ANON U with the pattern at several similar universities. The Consortium on Financing Higher Education (COFHE) provided us with data on overall yield rates and yield rates among minorities at a group of similar universities; the COFHE data do not allow us to disaggregate other schools' yield rates by students' incomes. 23 The yield rate data for these schools are summarized in figure 3 . Note that the yield data for ANON U in this figure differ from those in previous figures. In order to make the two panels of figure 3 fully comparable, we use the COFHE data for ANON U as well, reintroducing the early-admissions and international students into the sample. Figure 3 suggests that ANON U's peer institutions did not experience the dip in the yield rate that occurred in ANON U's class of 2001. This is consistent with the notion that the dip at ANON U was, in fact, transitory, for if more fundamental 22 This regression is reported as column (4) Controlling for student characteristics and total aid award. Notes: National-median-based low-income designation using 1999 as the base year. The low-income rate for each class year is computed as the sum of the low-income coefficient, class dummy coefficient, class ϫ low-income interaction, and base yield (1999, not low-income). The non-low-income rate for each class year is computed as the sum of the class dummy coefficient and the base yield (1999, not low-income). The yield rates are adjusted using the marginal-effects probit regression reported in column (3) of table 4.
forces were at work, ANON U's peer institutions would likely have experienced a similar phenomenon.
B. Multivariate Analysis
Overall Results: Column (1) of table 4 shows the results from estimating equation (6) without individual covariates (X it ). The coefficient on the program variable indicates that during the period it has been in effect, the yield rate for non-low-income students was 6.6 percentage points higher than previously, an increase that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the probability of a low-income student accepting the offer increased by 4.7 percentage points more than the probability of a non-low-income student between the two periods. However, the difference between the increase for non-low-income and low-income students is not statistically significant. Hence, in this basic model, we cannot detect a statistically discernible effect of the program on the yield of low-income students.
As table 2 shows, the composition of the admitted students changed substantially during the program period. Thus, in column (2) of table 4 we control for a variety of individual characteristics. All of the variables are dichotomous and familiar from table 1 except for the student's financial aid award, which reflects the value (in 1999 dollars) of the student's total financial aid from all sources. Controlling for the size of the package allows us to focus on the effect of the composition of the package. 24 Women were 2.6 percentage points less likely to accept an offer than men; alumni children were 15.5 percentage points more likely than their nonalumni counterparts to do so. As both academic and nonacademic ratings increased, the probability of accepting an offer fell. Recruited athletes were 8.4 percentage points more likely to accept an admissions offer; minority students were less likely to accept an offer than were nonminority students. 25 The difference-in-differences estimate of the program effect, ␤ 3 from equation (6), is smaller when the covariates are taken into account-0.020 versus 0.047 from column (1)-and is still not statistically different from 0.
An important assumption in equation (6) is that the non-low-income group was essentially homogeneous with respect to this program. However, students whose families' incomes fell within a small range above the national median income also had some, but not all, of their loans replaced with grants. It might be inappropriate to include these students in the comparison group. Hence, we reestimated equation (6) including on the right-hand side an indicator variable and an interaction with the program years for students whose incomes were greater than the national median but less than $57,000 (in 1996 dollars). 26 As shown in column (3) of table 4, the net program effect is essentially unchanged. Thus, our results appear robust to whether or not middle-income students are included in the comparison group.
As noted above, equation (6) also implicitly assumes that the effect of the new program was exactly the same for each class. In column (4) of table 4 we allow the effect for low-income students to vary by class as described in equation (7). The second figure in the column, the net program effect, is 0.023 with a standard error of 0.039. Again, this is essentially the same as the estimate of the program effect in column (2). Hence, allowing for separate class effects has little effect on our assessment of the program's impact. Moreover, the coefficients on the other covariates are barely affected.
Beginning with the class of 2000, two years before the financial aid policy change, ANON U switched from a nonbinding early-action program to a binding early-decision program. If this change affected the composition of the regular-decision body of students, one might be concerned that the exclusion of early-admission students from our analysis biases our results. In column (5) of table 4 we 24 If we use expected family contribution to control for family financial resources, we obtain substantially similar results. 25 We have also estimated specifications in which academic rating is interacted with other characteristics (such as race, whether athlete, or whether child of alumni), with substantively similar results. 26 Here $57,000 is the cutoff that the financial aid office used in the first year of the program. 
-YIELD RATES AT SIMILAR UNIVERSITIES
For minorities and for all students at seven other Northeastern universities. Notes: Both panels, including ANON U, use data provided by the Consortium on Financing Higher Education. ANON U data in this figure are not comparable with previous figures, due to the inclusion of early admissions and foreign students, included here for comparability with COFHE data from other universities. "Minority" refers to African-American, Hispanic, and Native American students. reintroduce the early applicants from all classes into our analysis and add controls for whether the student applied for early action or decision and whether the university followed an early-action or early-decision policy in that year. The coefficient of interest becomes somewhat smaller, and remains insignificantly different from 0 (as well as insignificantly different from the previous estimates). The estimated program effect falls because the indicator for early decision years (the classes of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] captures some of the recent rise in yields. We conclude that the change in early-admission policy does not significantly affect our results. (4) and (5) is calculated as the average of the class ϫ low-income interactions after the policy change (2002) (2003) (2004) minus the average of the interactions before the policy change. The base probability is the predicted probability of enrollment evaluated at the mean student characteristics. The class-of-2000 effect is omitted in column (5) because of collinearity with the program and early-decision year. The models in table 4 are estimated using the data for every class available to us. However, as noted above, including all previous classes in the comparison group may be inappropriate. In particular, the decision-making process of students admitted in the early years of our sample might have been quite different from those of the students admitted since 1998, perhaps because of differences in unobservable characteristics. An additional concern mentioned earlier is that the yield rate among low-income students in the year just prior to the adoption of the program may have been transitorily low.
Alternative Comparison Classes:
Because we have no compelling a priori reasons to view some years as more suitable for inclusion in the comparison group than others, we estimate the model with several different comparison groups. Table 5 As before, we focus on the interaction of the program and low-income dichotomous variables. The overall results are insensitive to the choice of years to include. The point estimates of the program effect range from 1.1 to 3.4 percentage points, in the same ballpark as those in table 4, and also are not statistically significant.
Comparisons with Peer Institutions:
Another way to gauge the impact of ANON U's financial policy is to make comparisons with yield rates at seven peer institutions. If there were a small change in ANON U's yield rate relative to that of its peers, it would be consistent with our finding that the program had a small effect (although other explanations, discussed below, are also possible). To implement this idea, we began by computing the change in yield rates at its peer institutions before and after the introduction of ANON U's program. We then subtracted this figure from the comparable change in ANON U's yield rate. This difference in differences was 3.9 percentage points with a standard error of 3.2 percentage points. The estimate is not statistically significant, and its magnitude is quite similar to that estimated using the data from ANON U alone, suggesting that the program had at most a small effect at ANON U.
In short, the finding that the program had no significant effect is robust to alternative specifications of the comparison group and alternative data sources.
Effects by Race and Ethnicity:
Much of the discussion of financial aid packages for low-income students has focused on recruiting minorities. In this context, an important question is whether minorities are similar to the sample as a whole with respect to their responsiveness to changes in financial aid packages. Thus, we estimate the models from table 4 with the sample restricted to minority students. This analysis compares the change in yield among low-income minorities with the change in yield among non-low-income minorities-we look for an effect of the program by lowincome status within the minority population, not for an effect of the program on minorities as a group. 27 The results are presented in table 6. The key finding is that the program effect was between 8 and 10 percentage points, an estimate significant at approximately the 10% level. This is a large effect relative to the base yield of 40% for minorities before the class of 2002. In the specification without controls for ethnic differences within the minority sample [column (2)], the effect is significant at the 0.079 level; with dichotomous variables for Hispanic and Native American origins included, the effect is significant at the 0.106 level. As in column (3) of table 4, column (4) shows that excluding middle-income students from the control group does not affect our key coefficient. On including the early-admissions students, as in column (5) of table 4, the significance level improves to better than 5%.
As noted above, we have COFHE data on minority yield rates from several of ANON U's peer institutions. As a second approach, we used these data to investigate how the minority yield rate changed at ANON U relative to its peers. The difference-in-differences estimate is 5.5 percentage points with a standard error of 2.0 percentage points, an estimate that is significant at the 10% level. Thus, yield rates among minorities increased at ANON U relative to its peer institutions after the program was introduced. This result is consistent with our findings based on ANON U data alone.
We conclude that, on average, the program had a larger impact on low-income minorities-the point estimate is more than twice that for the entire sample, and its standard error is not much bigger. 28 This is consistent with Jackson (1990) , who, using an approach rather different from ours, found that African-Americans' college attendance decisions respond positively to grants but not significantly to loans, and that African-Americans are about twice as responsive to grants as whites. 29 Discussion: Why didn't ANON U's change from loans to grants have a statistically discernible impact on the overall 27 Of the minority students, 23% were low-income, a larger fraction than the 10% of the overall sample, but still a fairly small one. As a result, the program did not have any significant effect on the matriculation of minorities as a group relative to nonminorities (in as much as over three-fourths of minorities were unaffected by the policy change).
28 Along the lines of table 5, we checked the robustness of this finding to the inclusion of various classes. The effect is not very sensitive to these changes. To the extent that there is a change, the impact becomes larger when we exclude the earlier classes. 29 There are substantial differences between Jackson's study and our own. His estimates are based on a sample of applicants to all colleges (High School and Beyond) as opposed to applicants to a single college. Further, Jackson models the probability of attending college as a function of the presence of loans or grants as opposed to examining a change in regime from loans to grants. Also, Jackson estimates separate effects for blacks and Hispanics. We do not attempt to estimate separate effects, because the number of Hispanics in our data is low. However, the estimates computed using only the sample of African-Americans are not substantially different from those that include Hispanics and Native Americans as well.
yield rate among low-income applicants, as would be expected given equation (4)? One possibility is that students are not as rational as hypothesized in our theoretical framework and therefore do not respond to changes in the price of college as we would expect. Avery and Hoxby (2004) , for example, find that although highly motivated students generally make decisions that are consistent with rational decision-making, a sizable minority do not. They explain the lack of rationality by a "lack of sophistication." Another possibility is that admitted students were not fully aware of the program or that peer institutions were changing their admissions policies (such as early decision) so that we cannot detect the effect of this single change in net price at ANON U. However, the program did have a significant (at the 10% level) effect among minorities. And we have no reason to believe that minorities are more rational or better informed about the program than nonminorities. Additionally, even if students were not aware of the program when they decided to apply, they usually received financial aid details at the same time as the admission offer, so they should have known how the program affected them when they made their enrollment decisions.
As for changing admissions policies at peer institutions, given that nonminority students are more likely to apply for early decision, if ANON U's peer institutions adopted early decision after ANON U, then there may have been a differential change in ANON U's yield rates for minorities and nonminorities in the years following the financial aid change. To investigate (5) and (6) is calculated as the average of the class ϫ low-income interactions after the policy change (2002) (2003) (2004) minus the average of the interactions before the policy change. The base probability is the predicted probability of enrollment evaluated at the of mean student characteristics. The class-of-2000 effect is omitted in column (6) because of collinearity with the program and early-decision year.
this possibility, we contacted admissions offices to determine the years in which ANON U's peer institutions adopted earlydecision policies. In general we found that these policies were adopted in the mid-1990s (before the change in financial aid policy at ANON U), if at all, so that we do not believe these policies are biasing our estimates.
Fourth, in our theoretical framework and interpretation of the results, we implicitly assume that ANON U's peer institutions did not also change their financial aid policies in response to ANON U's policy change. However, the reason we do not find an overall effect of the financial aid change on ANON U's yield rate might be that peer institutions effectively mimicked ANON U's new financial aid policy. Though we can say definitively that no peer institution officially adopted ANON U's no-loan policy, there were reports that some of ANON U's peer institutions moved to make their financial aid more generous in the wake of ANON U's announced policy change. 30 Additional data provided by COFHE allow us to approach this issue more systematically. Figure 4 , shows the average grant aid received by grant recipients at the same set of other northeastern universities used in figure 3 . 31 Had these other universities responded to ANON U's financial aid policy change, their grant aid would have increased for the classes of 2002 and 2003. However, average grant aid at the peer institutions continued to follow its existing trend through this period. 32 In addition, ANON U evidently provided slightly less grant aid than its peers until the class of 2001, but provided more grant aid for all subsequent classes (thereby surpassing its peer institutions at exactly the time it introduced its low-income loan reduction program). These data provide further support for the assumption that ANON U's peer institutions did not unofficially adopt ANON U's financial aid policy, although we acknowledge that this evidence is only suggestive. We also note that the fact that we estimate an effect for minority students suggests, at a minimum, that peer institutions did not fully respond.
Finally, the change in financial aid (loan replacements of approximately $4,000 per year) was fairly small relative to the average financial aid package of low-income students-$25,734, of which an average of approximately $20,000 would have been grants in the absence of the loanreplacement program (the remainder being jobs). Perhaps this incremental change was too small to have discernibly affected enrollment decisions. Additionally, the underlying elasticity may be small. The combination of a small treatment and a small elasticity may have made the program effect too small to estimate precisely, particularly given the inherent noisiness of the process.
In this context, it is useful to compare our results with other estimates of the effect of financial aid on college attendance. Analyzing enrollment patterns at another "east coast college," van der Klaauw (2002) estimates that low-income students have an enrollment elasticity with respect to college grants of 0.86. Table 7 shows the predicted effect of ANON U's financial aid policy change using van der Klaauw's elasticity. The perceived equivalent increase in total aid corresponding to a shift from loans to grants is hard to calculate, so we report a range of values: loans valued at one-half, one-third, and onequarter of the face value. For example, consider the implications of van der Klaauw's estimate assuming that (a) ANON U's base yield among preprogram low-income admits is 50%, (b) the preprogram base grant is $20,000, and (c) the $4,000 shift from loans to grants is valued by students at $2,000 (on the high side of the previous literature). In this case, the predicted effect on yield rates is an increase of 4.3 percentage points. 33 This is not significantly different from our estimated effect, from table 4, column (3), of 2.3 percentage points with a standard error of 3.8 percentage points. In short, though it is possible that ANON U's program had no impact on overall matriculation, we cannot reject the possibility that it had an impact similar to that found in previous analyses of enrollment decisions.
The question remains, however, why the program appears to have had a larger effect on the matriculation of minority applicants. The result might be attributable to economic resource differences, because family financial status is so highly correlated with race and ethnicity. For two reasons, however, we do not believe that family resources are the 30 Specifically, we searched the Chronicle of Higher Education for the year following ANON U's announced change in policy and found several articles reporting financial aid responses by peer institutions. 31 We would have preferred to analyze average grant aid among lowincome grant recipients. Unfortunately, no such data are available. Unlike the administrative data from ANON U, these data show the actual award made, rather than the initial offer. 32 An examination of the data institution by institution shows that this pattern holds for most of them individually as well as in aggregate. To maintain confidentiality, we do not display these results. There is one school that may have increased its grant aid for the class of 2003. However, that is the year in which ANON U's low-income yield showed the largest increase. If, in fact, a competitor increased its low-income grant aid in that year, it does not seem to have greatly affected ANON U's yield. 33 The calculation is as follows. By definition, if Y is the yield and A is the value of the aid package to the student, the elasticity is (⌬Y / Y) ϫ (A / ⌬A). Substituting into this expression, we have 0.86 ϭ (⌬Y / 0.5) ϫ ($20,000 / $2,000). Solving, ⌬Y ϭ 0.043. primary explanation for the differences by minority status. First, our model controls for the total size of the financial aid package, which, as observed above, is a one-dimensional index of a family's overall financial position. Second, the minorities affected by the loan-replacement program are not actually much poorer than the whites so affected. Among low-income minority admits, the mean family income was $24,177, only 10% less than the mean among low-income whites ($26,836) . Plotting the income densities (not shown) reveals that the distributions are similar as well. As a result, we do not believe that a difference in resources explains the larger effect among minorities.
A second explanation for the policy change's larger impact on minority students is that the pool of applicants from which ANON U admitted students may have changed after the new financial aid policies were instituted. As noted in section II, ANON U's admissions office reports that it did not change its recruitment strategies in the first three years after the policy change. Nevertheless, the change in financial aid policy may have induced some students who previously would not have considered ANON U to apply. Under what circumstances might such a change in the applicant pool bias our estimates?
If the admissions screening process generated the same mix of admitted students (such that the probability of enrolling at ANON U conditional on being admitted is unchanged), then our estimates are not likely affected by a change in the applicant pool. If, however, the change in financial aid policy also changed the probability that students were admitted (conditional on their low-income status), then our estimates may be biased. For example, if the extra (marginal) students who were induced to apply to ANON U were better qualified in ways not observed in our data, then their likelihood of being admitted would increase, which would bias our estimates. The sign of the bias depends on whether these marginal students were more or less likely to enroll conditional on acceptance. If these students were more likely to enroll at ANON U, then we have overestimated the effect of the financial aid program; if these students were less likely to enroll, then we have underestimated it. The magnitude of this bias is a function of the difference in probability of enrolling at ANON U between the students induced to apply because of the financial aid change and those who would have applied anyway, weighted by the proportion of marginal students in the admit pool.
We assess the likely affect of a change in the applicant pool on our estimates by considering both aspects of the bias in turn. We begin by assessing whether the applicant pool changed using data from the College Board on SAT test-takers. As discussed earlier, we model the student's decision to have his or her SAT scores sent to ANON U using a model analogous to that in equation (6). Those who took the SAT after January 1998 are considered to have been potentially affected by the policy change; those who took the SAT before then are part of the comparison group. The results are presented in table 8. Overall, approximately 2.2% of SAT takers requested to have their scores sent to ANON U. 34 Without controlling for other covariates [column (1)], low-income students who took the SAT after the announcement of the policy change were no more likely to express interest in ANON U than low-income students who took the test earlier [the coefficient estimate is 0.00003 (0.003 Ϭ 100) percentage points with a p-value of 0.95]. Once one controls for student characteristics, as shown in column (2), low-income students were 0.00051 percentage points more likely to express interest in ANON U after the announcement of the policy change. This increase is a relatively small 3.9% of the overall likelihood that a low-income student expresses interest in ANON U, although the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. The story for minority applicants, however, is quite different, as shown in columns (3) and (4). Low-income minority students who took the SAT after the announcement were less likely to express interest in ANON U, although the effect essentially disappears once one controls for student characteristics. 34 Figure A1 in the appendix shows the percentage of students expressing interest in ANON U, by the year they took the SAT test. These results suggest that among low-income students, overall, there may have been a small increase in interest in applying to ANON U. However, there was no detectable effect among minority applicants. The second component of the bias arises if the admitted pool changed after the change in financial aid policy. Though again we cannot assess whether the admitted students differed from those in previous years on unobservable characteristics, we can assess whether observed characteristics of the admitted students appear to have changed after the policy change. The basic results are presented in table 2, which shows the demographic characteristics of the admitted classes by year. The proportion of low-income students among those admitted did not change appreciably (and more formal tests indicate any observed changes in the composition were not statistically significant at conventional levels). Further, in comparison with the years immediately before the policy change, there is no appreciable change in the proportion of minority students. We therefore suspect that there is little bias in our estimates of the effect of the change in financial aid policy due to the potentially small change in the nonminority applicant pool (although we cannot draw a definitive conclusion without further data).
A final explanation for the greater impact among minorities is differing perceptions between minorities and nonminorities about the burden of financing college through loans. Such differences may be due to greater uncertainty among minorities about the future returns to college education, and hence ability to repay loans. In this context, recall the result of our model in section III,
where is the net advantage to attending ANON U, L is loan payments, G is earnings on a good job, B is earnings on a bad job, and p is the probability of obtaining a good job after college.
Assuming that the marginal utility of income is decreasing, then equation (5) is positive. Because the marginal disutility of loans increases as p decreases, those with a lower value of p (and hence with lower expected future earnings) will be more averse to financing their education through debt. That minorities may expect lower future earnings than nonminorities is consistent with much empirical literature (for example, Neal & Johnson, 1996) . A difference in expected future earnings therefore provides a possible explanation for the larger effect of ANON U's change in financial aid policy on minority students.
VI. Conclusion
We examine a program instituted at an anonymous university to replace loans with grant aid for low-income students. We find the program increased the likelihood of matriculation by low-income students by approximately 3 percentage points, although the effect is not statistically significant. The effect among low-income minority students was between 8 and 10 percentage points and statistically significant at the 10% level. Our estimates may understate the impact that such a program would have if it were undertaken more broadly, as they pertain only to the enrollment decisions at one institution. Nevertheless, as institutions consider increasing financial aid as a strategy to increase the representation of low-income students on college campuses, they should be aware that unilateral adoption of such programs may generate only modest increases in the economic diversity of their student bodies. FINANCIAL AID PACKAGES AND COLLEGE ENROLLMENT DECISIONS 145
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